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| PHIL0214-2 | Phenomenology and philosophy of mind
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| Duration : | 30h Th |
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| Lecturer : | Arnaud Dewalque |
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Language(s) of instruction :
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| French language |
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Organisation and examination :
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| Teaching in the first semester, review in January |
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Course contents :
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| This course is devoted to the examination of a currently disputed topic at the crossroads of phenomenology and philosophy of mind. In 2014-2015 the topic will be: consciousness and representation.
Representationalism, broadly conceived, is the view that the mind's capability of representing the world and processing information is the most basic property of our mental life. In a more polemical fashion, "strong" representationalists hold that it is possible to account for any mental episode without being committed to the existence of any non-representational extra-ingredient ("qualia", "subjective feelings", "intentional modes", and the like).
Within the framework of this course, we will discuss some arguments for or against this view, and compare the respective benefits (or shortcomings) of the various versions of representationalism that have been proposed so far in the literature. More pointedly, we will devote special attention to some elements of our mental life which seem to challenge intentionalism or representationalism: emotions, feelings, bodily sensations, and sense impressions. Those terms typically refer to phenomena which seem hardly compatible with representationalism. We will address a small number of related questions. Theses questions will be divided into three groups:
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Emotions and representations: Do emotional attitudes (emotions, feelings, moods, and the like) have a representational content? Does the very notion of content apply in some plausible sense to those phenomena?
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Sensations and representations: What kind of relation holds between sense data (or qualitative data) and representational contents? Are the notions of 'sense data' and 'qualia' still usable in the present days? Is there an intentionality of sensations?
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Sensations and unity: Where does the (subjective and objective) unity of our sensory experiences come from? What are 'sensory fields' and how do they come into existence?
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Learning outcomes of the course :
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| By the end of the course, students are supposed to understand what is at stake in the topic under examination. |
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Prerequisites and co-requisites/ Recommended optional programme components :
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| Bachelor in Philosophy. |
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Planned learning activities and teaching methods :
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| Lectures based on the main texts which have contributed to the development of the studied topic. It is expected that students take part actively to the study of the texts. |
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Mode of delivery (face-to-face ; distance-learning) :
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| All interested who wish to attend the course without being registered to the Master in philosophy (option: "Phenomenology") are most welcome. They are asked to get in touch with the professor at the beginning of the semester.
For schedule and room: see http://cipl82.philo.ulg.ac.be/horaires |
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Recommended or required readings :
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| Complete bibliography will be made available during the course. Set books will include:
- Franz Brentano, Sensory and Noetic Consciousness. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint III. Transl. by M. Schättle and L. McAlister. London: Routledge, 1981.
- Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations. Trans. J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge, 1973.
- David M. Armstrong, Bodily Sensations, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.
- Fred Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge (Mass.), The MIT Press, 1995.
- Michael Tye, "The Intentionality of Feelings and Experiences", in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995, Ch. 4, 93-130.
- Jérôme Dokic, "Qui a peur des qualia corporels?", dansPhilosophiques 27/1 (2000), p. 77-98.
- Alex Byrne, "Intentionalism Defended", in The Philosophical Review 110/2 (2001), p. 199-240.
- Tim Crane, Elements of Mind, New York: OUP, 2001.
- Michael Tye, Consciousness and Persons. Unity and Identity. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.
- Tim Crane, "The Intentional Structure of Consciousness", in A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: OUP, 2003.
- David Chalmers, "The Representational Character of Experience", in B. Leiter (ed.), The Future of Philosophy, New York: OUP, 2004, p. 153-181.
- Charles Travis, "The Silence of the Senses", in Mind 113 (2004), p. 57-94.
- Bill Brewer, "Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience", in Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), p. 61-77.
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Assessment methods and criteria :
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| Participants are asked to choose one of the two following assessment modalities:
1/ Oral exam on the whole course content (100%).
2/ Personal work. The work will consist either in presenting the argumentation-line of one of the main protagonists of the debate or in reexamining a classical author of the phenomenological tradition from issues discussed during the course. The examination will be made on the basis of:
- oral presentation of the work (50%)
- written revised version of the work (50%)
Schedule will be determined with participants in the first lesson. |
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Work placement(s) :
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Organizational remarks :
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Contacts :
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| Teacher
Arnaud Dewalque
Dpt of Philosophy
7, Place du 20-août, Building A1/2nd floor
B-4000 Liège
Phone 0032 (4) 366 55 93
E-mail a.dewalque@ulg.ac.be |
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