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| ECON0929-2 | Games and Information Economics
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| Duration : | 30h Th |
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| Credits/ECTS : |
| Master in Economical Sciences, in-depth approach, 1st year | | First semester | | 5 |
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| Master in Economical Sciences, didactic approach, 1st year | | First semester | | 5 |
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| Master in Economical Sciences, Professional Focus in Economic Policies and Analysis, 1st year | | First semester | | 5 |
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| Master en sciences économiques,orientation générale, à finalité spécialisée en economics and finance, 1st year | | First semester | | 5 |
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| Master en sciences économiques, orientation générale, à finalité spécialisée en economic analysis and public governance, 1st year | | First semester | | 5 |
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| Holder(s) : | Axel Gautier |
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| Language : | English language |
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| Course contents : | Following the recent financial crisis, many questions are raised on the role of (possibly misaligned) incentives in the financial sector and on the importance of information in markets: Do bonuses based on short-term portfolio performance induce the financial managers to take excessive risk? Should financial bonuses be re-designed to include a penalty in case of bad performance? Is there a conflict between short-run performance and long-term growth? Is the information provided by private credit rating agencies accurate? and trustable? How should these agencies be rewarded? Is it possible to align the incentive of the bankers with public interest and how? These debates illustrate the importance that incentives, information and strategic interactions have taken in modern economics.
The course of Games and Information Economics focuses on these three concepts. The objectives of the course are twofold: First, it develops analytical tools to understand strategic interaction between agents and the role of information in bilateral relations and markets. Second, the course abundantly illustrates the main theoretical concepts with real-world examples and applications.
Course outline
1. Static games of complete information.
Applications: common resources, prisoner's dilemma
2. Dynamic (repeated) games of complete information.
Applications: bargaining, tacit collusion, bank runs
3. Games of incomplete information
Applications: auctions
4. Markets with imperfect information
Applications: insurance theory, lemon market, liquidity dry-out
5. Information economics
Applications: incentives and performance related pay |
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| Prerequisites : | Basic knowledge of single variable calculus and probability. |
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| Workshops : | Exercice sessions (15h) |
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| Written notes : | Main reference
A Pimer in Game Theory
R. Gibbons
1992
Pearson Education (FT) |
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| Assessment : | Written exam |
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| Contacts : | Lecturer: Axel GAUTIER
Email: agautier@ulg.ac.be
Office I.49, BAT B31 (ST)
Tel: 04/366.30.53
Assistant: Ekaterina TARANTCHENKO Email: E.Tarantchenko@ulg.ac.be
Tel: 04/366.31.74 |
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| Remarks : | This course will be given in English |
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